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In this paper, we analyze the interactions between growth and the contracting environment
in the production sector. Allowing incompleteness in contracting implies that viable produc-
tion relationships for ￿rms and workers, and therefore the pro￿tability of industries, depend
on the rates of innovation and growth. The speed at which new innovations arrive in turn
depends on the pro￿tability of production, for the usual reasons examined in the endogenous
growth literature. We show that these interactions can have important implications which are
consistent with observed phenomena in both the micro and macro environment. In particular,
we demonstrate that a technological shock (increasing productivity of research) can, through
this interaction, lead to a productivity slowdown and a shift in labour market contracts toward
more short term arrangements. We show the consistency of an increase in the proportion of
the labour force under short term employment, unchanged turnover, increased relative returns
of workers in high productivity sectors, and increased income inequality, with a productivity
slowdown of ￿nite duration.
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11 Introduction
Though di￿cult to date precisely, the early 1970s seemed to herald three major waves of change
in the US macroeconomy. These were: (1) the IT revolution, (2) the productivity slowdown and
(3) the commencement of the erosion of internal labor markets.1 This paper demonstrates a link
between all three. The starting point for our analysis is recognition of the fact that the set of
feasible contracting relationships between workers and ￿rms is constrained by the macroeconomy,
while simultaneously macroeconomic variables are a￿ected by microeconomic incentives.
Speci￿cally, we consider an environment where ￿rms and workers cannot explicitly contract
over worker e￿ort in production, and analyze the form of \relational contracts" in their repeated
interaction that will support a productive relationship.2 One possible form of relational contract
is for the ￿rm to reward workers with delayed bene￿ts that are paid only once the worker’s e￿ort is
ascertained by the ￿rm. We refer to such a relational contract as an \internal labor market" and
its existence depends critically on the ￿rm’s valuation of its reputation. This, however, depends
on the ￿rm’s expected life-time. In an environment with high potential growth and rapid ￿rm
turnover, ￿rms cannot make credible promises of delayed reward to workers, so the internal labor
market is necessarily limited. This is the sense in which the macroeconomy constrains feasible
micro level contracts. On the other hand, incentives to innovate, and hence the economy’s growth
rate, depend on returns in production, which are lower when labour costs are high, that is, when
the internal labor market is limited. Thus, micro level contracting relationships also a￿ect the
macro environment. We show here that these interrelationships can explain the US economy’s
behaviour along the three dimensions above.
Put simply, our story is as follows. The information technology (IT) revolution heralded a
period of high productivity of inventive e￿ort.3 In addition to its productivity, however, returns
to inventive e￿ort depend on the degree to which successes can be pro￿ted from. This, in turn
depends on the form of contracting relationship between ￿rms and employees. Since employees
will have to be hired to use the new technologies that are developed. Prior to the slowdown, these
contracting relationships could best be characterized as an internal labor market; ￿rms rewarded
workers with deferred bene￿ts and were themselves disciplined to provide these rewards by their
own reputation in the labor market. The increased innovative potential accompanying the IT
revolution implied more rapid turnover in best-practice productive arrangements. These eventu-
ally reached a point (which may have di￿ered by sector) where ￿rms’ labor market reputations
provided insu￿cient discipline for the maintenance of the internal labor market. Thus, while the
1We review the evidence in support of these assertions in the next section.
2The term \relational contract" has been used by Baker Gibbons and Murphy (1997) to denote these sorts of
implicit contracts, a special case of these have also been called \e￿ciency wage" contracts. These are discussed,
and the related literature reviewed in Malcomson (1999).
3Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) date the IT revolution to the early 1970’s.
1IT revolution began working its way through the economy, within industry labor markets un-
derwent a fundamental change from being internal labor markets to what we term \contractor"
based labor markets. We present the evidence for the increase in such labor markets in the next
section. In a contractor labor market, the moral hazard is not borne by the employer but by
labor, who are disciplined by their own reputations to provide correct e￿ort. This leads to a shift
in the distribution of returns away from ￿rms towards labor since, as has already been realized
in the theoretical literature, see Macleod and Malcomson (1989), incentive compatibility requires
that the party standing to gain from opportunistic behavior must receive a surplus to continued
honest participation. Each industry where the labor market undergoes such a restructuring thus
experiences an industry wide decline in returns to innovation which o￿sets the potential pro-
ductivity gains from the IT revolution. Thus, over this phase, the induced changes in the labor
market heralded in by the IT revolution lead to the seemingly paradoxical possibility of lower
productivity growth while the raw productivity of labor in research rose.4
Part of this paper’s aim is more theoretical in focus. A major contribution of the recent
technology based branch of the endogenous growth literature is its incorporation of plausible mi-
croeconomic foundations for innovation as a determinant of growth. For reasons of tractability,
this literature has abstracted from many microeconomic complexities. In particular, in the labor
market, an obvious abstraction is the implicit assumption of completeness in contracting relations
between workers and ￿rms, which allows workers to be rewarded with a market clearing compet-
itive wage. This contrasts with the more careful modelling of production relationships in both
industrial organization and labor economics, where production under incomplete contracting has
been more thoroughly examined.5 Here, we allow for such incompleteness in contracting.
Formally, we augment a standard Schumpeterian growth model, as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), with incomplete contracting in production. We exclude the
possibility of legally enforceable payments for worker e￿ort, and consider only those e￿ort/wage
pairs that are self-enforcing. It has been widely argued that the non-veri￿able particulars of
a worker/￿rm relationship do not allow for explicit contracting over payments that are contin-
gent upon worker performance (see Macleod and Malcomson 1989). In such a framework, only
self-enforcing payments and e￿ort will be supplied in equilibrium. With su￿cient surplus to pro-
duction arrangements, however, it is well known that a multiplicity of self-enforcing wage/e￿ort
pairs is possible. It is in the creation of a surplus that innovation a￿ects contracting. In an
endogenous growth context, the surpluses required to sustain production arise naturally as the
rewards to successful innovative activity. Thus, in our environment, monopoly pro￿ts to innova-
tion serve two roles: in addition to the standard role of providing incentives for innovation they
4Information possessing capacity, or the IT revolution can be thought of as a general purpose technology, which
is how we model it. However nothing in the model requires that it be ‘general’ in fact the results will obtain if
di￿erent sectors are a￿ected to di￿ering degrees.
5For surveys, see Hart (1995), Gibbons (1997) and Malcomson (1999).
2serve to provide su￿cient surplus so that performance contingent implicit contracts can be self
enforcing.
There is already a large literature exploring the macroeconomic implications of microeconomic
models of the employment relationship, in particular with respect to aggregate employment levels,
(Macleod, Malcomson and Gomme 1994 and Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984), and job destruction over
the cycle; (Ramey and Watson 1997, Caballero and Hammour 1996). A closer precursor of this
work is Aghion and Howitt (1994) which explores causation from growth rates to unemployment
through the destructive e￿ects of new knowledge on existing job matches. At a theoretical level,
Ramey and Watson (1997) also related the feasibility of the incomplete contracting relationship
and its vulnerability to aggregate downturns. A major di￿erence is that their work is concerned
with cyclical aspects of this relationship and they do not explore the reverse direction of e￿ect
of micro contracting on the macroeconomy. The present paper is the ￿rst, to our knowledge,
to explore the e￿ects of the macro environment (in particular the innovation arrival, and hence
growth, rate) on the possibility for contracting at the micro level, and also to explore the reverse
causation of contracting at the micro level’s e￿ects on growth.
The explanation arising from our model resembles previous attempts to explain the slowdown
by labor market induced changes in innovation, or dissemination and implementation of new
technology, i.e., Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Lloyd-Ellis
(1999). Since these approaches do not including a role for contracting at the micro level, they are
clearly structurally very di￿erent to the one we present. However, since they essentially attempt to
explain a similar set of phenomena, we leave to a later section discussion of the precise distinction
between our analysis and these in terms of predictions. Before developing our story more formally
however, we provide a brief overview of the facts motivating our analysis.
1.1 Changes in the macro and micro environment over the 70’s and 80’s
1.1.1 The productivity slowdown:
Since the early 1970s there has been a secular decline in the rate of productivity growth (both
labor and total factor) in many western developed economies. Focusing on the US, from a trend
rate of approximately 2.2% from 1950-1972, the rate of labor productivity growth (excluding
agriculture) declined to about 1% from 1972 to 1987 and 1.2% from 1987 to 1994. There has
been some debate as to the reliability of measures of productivity growth. Krussell and Hornstein
(1996) argue that the slowdown is overstated due to mismeasurement of the new, and hence most
rapidly growing, sectors, see also Grilliches (1994) and Sichel (1997) on this. However, Gordon
(1996) accounts for these measurement errors and shows that, though these have severely biased
sectoral measures of productivity, they imply, if anything, an increase and persistence in the level
of the slowdown at an aggregate level. More recently, Dolmas, Raj and Slottje (1999) present
formal statistical evidence that the log level of productivity underwent a change in both level
3and slope of its linear trend in the 1970s. Over the late 1990’s growth in labour productivity has
increased once again, from 1995-1999 output per hour in non-farm business grew at an average
annual rate of 2.5%, see Oliner and Sichel (2000).
1.1.2 Research and Development:
In face of the decline in productivity growth, the level of resources devoted to research and
development do not appear to have diminished over the corresponding period. In fact, the
evidence suggests that the number of researchers in both the US and G-5 economies has increased
steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s, see Jones (1998). In absolute numbers, this has been
clearly the case in all of these economies; proportionately, this has also been true, except for the
early part of the 1970s in the US.
1.1.3 The labor market:
The rise of contract work. There has been a large increase in the number of contingent workers, or
those working without an expectation of ongoing employment. Recent estimates put the numbers
in such positions at 12 million workers or over 10% of the US labor force, see Cohany (1996).
Early accounts of this phenomenon tended to treat these individuals as a homogeneous group,
but it is important to distinguish at least two distinct types of contingent workers. At one end of
this group are \temp" workers. These are workers ￿lling relatively low paid jobs with low skills,
little opportunity for advance and low job satisfaction. It appears that the rise in their numbers
has been motivated largely by cost reducing considerations on the part of employers, see Abraham
(1990, p. 102), and therefore that these changes are not directly related to the considerations
at the heart of this paper. Despite the large amount of media attention these individuals have
received, they do not make up the bulk of the contingently employed. Approximately 8.3 million of
the 12 million workers in non-traditional arrangements are independent contractors, 75% of whom
work alone. There is no evidence that the increase in their numbers is attributable to employers
cutting costs; rates of pay for independent contractors in business service ￿rms are comparable
to or higher than rates of pay to the permanent employees, (Abraham 1990, p. 102). These
are generally relatively highly educated and highly paid individuals who experience considerable
job satisfaction, see Cohany (1996, p. 35). This growth in contract work has been discussed by
Segal and Sullivan (1997) and Abraham and Taylor (1996). Amongst these predominately white
collar workers there has been a considerable decline in job security. As presented in Aaronson
and Sullivan (1998), surveys of worker perceptions of job security in the General Social Survey,
spanning 1977-1996, carried out by the National Opinion Research Center show that white collar
and college educated workers experienced substantial increases in job insecurity in the 1990s.
The period also corresponded with a \sea-change" in the norms and expectations of professional
careers, caused by the erosion of internal labor markets, see Smith (1997) and D. Gordon (1996).
4This down-ward trend in job security is also reported for the same date by Schmidt (1999).
She further breaks down the trend by worker category and ￿nds that, during the 90’s both
white collar and service sector workers experienced more pessimisim about keeping their jobs
whereas blue-collar workers became more optimistic. The trend increase in pessimism about job
loss over the period was also present in highly educated workers (those with some college and
college graduates) but not for those with only high school education. She also shows that, when
controlling for occupation, education and age, the fears of job loss increased over the period
1991-96 relative to its level from 1982-90.
Turnover. Surprisingly, though there has been a well documented increase in the number
of workers that are working under explicitly short-term arrangements, there was initially little
evidence of an increase in turnover rates. Diebold, Neumark and Polansky (1997) and Farber
(1998) focusing on average job tenure, found these to be relatively constant from the 70s. How-
ever, a recent study by Boisjoly, Duncan and Smeeding (1998) using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) found that involuntary seperations for men with strong labor market attach-
ment increased from the early 70’s to the early 90’s. This was also found by Valletta (1998)
for involuntary seperations into unemployment, using the CPS over the same period. Using the
Displaced Worker Survey, others have found high rates of displacement in the early 90’s due
to abolition of position or shift and plant closings over the period 1993-95, see Kletzer (1998).
More recently, Valletta (1999), using the PSID, has shown a signi￿cant decline from 1976-1993
in incentives to maintain existing employment relationships for male workers and skilled females.
There is also evidence, presented in Idson and Valletta (1996) that involuntary separations of
high tenure workers sometimes re￿ected employer breach of implicit employment contracts.
1.2 Structure of the paper
Section 2 of the paper develops the basic model. This is largely a standard Schumpeterian model
of growth except that we allow for incomplete contracting in production. The severity of this
contracting problem will be seen to vary with the expected productive lives of ￿rms. We introduce
sectoral heterogeneity, so that these lifetimes may vary across industries. Section 3 considers the
steady state implications of the model, both with and without contracting incompleteness. We
￿rst consider the e￿ect of an exogenous increase in the productivity of research in the benchmark
model, treating the contracting environment as ￿xed. This captures the e￿ect of the IT revolution
in opening up new vistas and possibilities. The model is shown to display the usual scale e￿ects
common to such R and D based growth models.
The next section then modi￿es the benchmark model by allowing for contractual incomplete-
ness. Here, human capital sellers and buyers cannot write binding agreements over the partic-
ulars of their production arrangement. We allow only self-enforcing contracts, and show that
the contracting structure endogenously varies with the change in the economy’s human capital
5endowment. This is the most important analytical section of the paper. Contracting is adversely
a￿ected by the increase in arrival rates induced by the increase in R and D and we here demon-
strate the conditions necessary for a slowdown to occur. This section also yields an explanation
for observed changes in inequality and the distribution of earnings over the same period which
we also discuss. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Our analysis follows closely that of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman’s
(1991) Schumpeterian model of growth through creative destruction. The numeraire ￿nal good
y(t) is produced by using intermediate goods, xj (t); that are distributed uniformly over the unit





These intermediate good industries are further di￿erentiated into M types or sectors, where
types are indexed by m: These types are di￿erentiated by the step size in the quality ladder,
￿m. This step size represents the size of an incremental improvement, or innovation in one of the
industries in sector m.6 We assume a measure 1
M of industries within each sector. Without loss of
generality, we order these sectors such that m < m+1 implies ￿m < ￿m+1: Let a measure N ￿ 1
denote the amount of human capital in the economy. Each worker can be thought of as possessing
one unit of human capital and these workers are endogenously allocated between research and
production such that there are L production workers and R research workers; L + R = N. Since
our interest is in productivity growth, we focus on the allocation of that portion of the economy’s
labor stock with enough human capital to contribute to growth generating activities (which we
term research). We thus ignore other potential inputs, such as unskilled labor, and assume that
all the human capital in the model is perfectly substitutable between production and research.7
Intermediate industries are operated by monopolists using human capital as the only input to
production. At any time, the current monopolist in an industry is the ￿rm which has developed
the state of the art production technique, over which it has an in￿nitely lived patent. Thus, if
at time t, there have been nj(t) innovations in industry j the monopolist holding the nj (t)th
innovation produces according to the production function xj = ￿
nj(t)
j Lj, where Lj is the human






xj; where wj(t) is the wage paid in industry j.
6We could have modelled all sectors as having the same size of quality step, and only being di￿erentiated by
having di￿erent innovation probabilities. This would not qualitatively alter our ￿ndings.
7We thereby abstract from issues of human capital accumulation and ability-biased technological change that
may lead to a slowdown through di￿erent channels as in Galor and Moav (1999), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), and
Helpman and Rangel (1999).
6Due to the unit elasticity of demand, implied by the Cobb-Douglas ￿nal good production
technology, monopolists wish to set the price of intermediate goods as high as possible. Therefore,
they limit price at the marginal cost of production using the previous technology. Thus, the unit

















Cobb-Douglas structure implies that the demand for the good is xj (t) =
y(t)
pj , where y(t) is the
total amount of the ￿nal good, and since its price is the numeraire, it is also the total expenditure.




w(t) , and that the amount of human capital demanded in industry
j is Lj =
y(t)
￿jw(t).
Note that pro￿ts are a function of the quality step ￿j and the wages wj(t) paid. In equilibrium,
the level of pro￿t and therefore of ￿ will determine how much innovation is undertaken and this
will correspondingly determine the wage and e￿ort pairs that are viable.
Individuals consume the ￿nal good according to the following identical CES utility function,











Workers are replaced when they die to maintain a constant population size.
2.1 Innovation problem
Let Sj (t) be the total number of researchers in industry j at time t and ￿￿(Sj (t)) is the prob-
ability of an innovation arriving in industry j in period t: ￿ is assumed to be increasing and
concave with ￿(0) = 0 and ￿(N) < 1, and ￿ < 1 is a technological parameter:9 We assume that
each researcher in industry j has an equal probability of having the ￿rst innovation in period t;
denoted ￿￿(Sj (t)) = ￿
Sj(t)￿(Sj (t)). The concavity of ￿ is su￿cient to render ￿ also concave,
and it is also the case that ￿ is decreasing in Sj. That is, the probability of an individual being
the ￿rst innovator falls with the number of innovators. There is free entry into research activities
in all sectors, so that researchers will enter up until expected returns equal opportunity costs.
Letting V j (t + 1) be the lifetime expected value of a successful innovation at t, researchers will
enter up until ￿￿(Sj)V
j
t+1 = w(t). Since the per period pro￿t in period t is denoted ￿j(t); and
8Note that w(t), denotes the unit labour cost were production to be undertaken using the old technology. It will
be seen subsequently that this does not vary across industries and that it does not necessarily equal the prevailing
wage in industry j; w
j (t):
9We assume that after one innovation arrives all researchers stop researching until the next period. This is
justi￿ed where innovators ￿nd out about a competitor’s success immediately and thus stop researching until the
details of the competitor’s success become freely available, i.e., until the next period when the competitor sets up
in production. At this point, research e￿orts start afresh. This also simpli￿es the analysis by avoiding multiple
innovations by di￿erent ￿rms within a given period.
7is stationary in steady state (so, ￿j(t + 1) = (1 + g)￿j(t) for all t), we can rewrite V j (t + 1)







where the stream of pro￿ts are discounted by not only the
￿rm’s discount factor (the rate of interest), r; but also by the expected future innovation rate,
￿￿(Sj);and the growth rate of the economy. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), this additional dis-
count arises due to the possibility of a future innovator succeeding and usurping the incumbent’s
leading position.








Given the assumptions on ￿(Sj) and ￿(Sj), higher instantaneous pro￿ts imply more innovative
e￿ort, Sj; is undertaken ceteris parabus.
2.2 Stationary Steady State
First, we characterize the stationary steady state equilibrium, while assuming away any con-
tracting problems in production.10 That is, ￿rms are all able to engage in traditional labor
relationships, they can credibly commit to paying workers for labor e￿ort. In reality, the issue is
not simply a commitment to pay, but instead all of the elements of deferred compensation that
characterize traditional labor relations, i.e., promotion opportunities, increased responsibility and
job security. Later, we explicitly examine how the ￿rm’s ability to make these commitments may
vary with the state of the macroeconomy or its sectoral particulars. Given the similarities between
the benchmark model and those of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991),
we are deliberately brief in describing the equilibrium conditions here, but they are treated more
fully in the next section.
2.3 No Contracting Issues
We proceed by conjecturing that, in steady state y(t) = cw(t); where c is a constant. This will
be veri￿ed subsequently. Recall that investment in innovation is given by the following ￿rst order
conditions:
￿￿(Sj)






]y(t + 1) = w(t) for all j: (2)
Substituting in y(t) = cw(t) and y(t + 1) = (1 + g)y (t), the allocation of the economy’s total
human capital endowment, N; is given by
￿￿(Sj)










10Although there also exists another equilibrium in which the economy cycles between high and low growth



















Since, in steady state, y(t) = cw(t), then,






So, the growth rate is given by
























This expression looks exactly like the Grossman and Helpman (1991) expression for growth. We
now verify the steady state conjecture:
Using the production labor market clearing condition (noting that the proportion of the work































So, the conjecture is veri￿ed, w(t) grows at the same rate as y(t). Finally, the rate of change
in consumption is related to the growth rate through the consumer’s intertemporal optimization
problem. Given the CES preferences, this problem is solved as:















The existence of a steady state almost analogous to the one above has already been well
analyzed so that we will not dwell on it further here, see Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992).
93 The model with incomplete contracts
We now assume that there is moral hazard in production and incomplete contracting. A simple
form of incompleteness arises if we assume a worker’s output is non-observable to third parties,
but known to both worker and ￿rm only after a lag of one period. The non-third party veri￿ability
precludes the use of contracts linking worker payment to output produced. We shall assume that
this incompleteness only occurs in intermediate production, not in the research sector where we
suppose that research can be undertaken by private individuals who, since working alone, do not
face moral hazard.11 Formally, contracting incompleteness arises due to information limitations
as follows.
ASSUMPTION 1:
Public information: All workers and ￿rms know the identity of employers and their employees,
in all previous periods. The particulars of the worker/￿rm relationship, in particular whether
promised bonuses are paid by the ￿rm, or promised e￿ort is contributed by the worker, are not
known publically.
Worker’s private information: At each period t; a worker knows her own wage payments,
w(￿) for all previous periods ￿ < t; and her own work performance for all periods ￿ < t: In
addition, she knows whether ￿rms in which she was employed in any period ￿ < t had delivered
any promised deferred payments to her.
Firm’s private information: At each period t; a ￿rm knows the history of wage payments
made to all of its past workers by it in all periods ￿ < t: It also knows the e￿ort contribution of
its employees whilst employed with the ￿rm, in all periods upto t:
A worker’s e￿ort contribution in period t is not observable to the ￿rm in which it is employed
until the end of the period: In any case, contracts can only be written on veri￿able, and hence
public, information. Thus, it is not possible to write a contract which ties a worker’s payment to
their e￿ort contribution at a particular ￿rm, since, even though this is known to the worker and
￿rm eventually, it cannot be veri￿ed by a third party. Malcomson (1999) discusses the advantages
of such an approach to analyzing real-world employment relationships, and provides a survey of
this literature.
In general, there are two types of implicit contract (termed relational contracts in this envi-
ronment) that can solve the incomplete contracting problem and yield incentive compatible self
enforcing contracts: one allows for the worker to be subject to moral hazard in e￿ort and the
11This is for simplicity only, we could have also introduced it in the research sector, the e￿ects would not di￿er
qualitatively from those in this simpler version of the model. However note that in the present version there is no
expected surplus in R and D. Of course, the model would have to be altered such that there would exist su￿cient
surplus to allow agents to get around this contractibility problem.
10other allows for the ￿rm to be subject to moral hazard in payment. We shall refer to the ￿rst
case as the case of \contractors"; and the second case as that of an \internal labor market".
3.1 The contractor case
In the case when ￿rms hire contractors, the moral hazard problem resides with the workers.
These individuals contract their labor services to the ￿rm on a per period basis. The contractual
relationship speci￿es a payment to the contractor, which is made by the ￿rm at the start of
the period; hence before the contractor’s e￿ort has been applied to production, and before the
￿rm observes e￿ort. At the end of the period, the ￿rm observes the contractor’s e￿ort. If the
correct e￿ort was exerted, the implicit contract speci￿es the contractor will be re-hired in the next
period, under the same implicit contract. If not, they will be dismissed.12 Thus the contractor’s
reputation, and the potential for future above market clearing returns that it a￿ords, provides
incentives to contribute the promised e￿ort.
For it to be incentive compatible for these contractors to supply correct e￿ort, the wage they
are paid must be su￿ciently greater than their opportunity costs. We denote this incentive
compatible contractor’s wage by wc(t) and note that these contractors live another period with
probability ￿; since they are simply agents in the model. The contractor’s incentive compatibility
constraint must guarantee that the contractor has a higher discounted utility from not shirking
than from shirking in period t. In this environment with its perfect capital markets, it is su￿cient
to consider the present discounted income associated with either choice. As a consequence, a














If a contractor produces the correct amount, he continues to receive the payment wc (t) each
period. This is because, even if the current monopolist turns over, his reputation as a reliable
contractor in that industry persists, consequently the new incumbent will hire him as well. Hence,
we obtain the left hand side of (7): If a contractor shirks, he takes the contract but does not
provide the correct e￿ort. The optimal form of shirking here will be to provide no e￿ort for the
￿rm, but instead work elsewhere and obtain the value of labor e￿ort on the market, w(t). In
subsequent periods, a shirker will never again be hired as a contractor and must always work at
the going wage w(t):13 This, then, yields the right hand side of (7):
12We keep discussion of the strategies which support this implicit contract informal in the text and provide a
more formal treatment of the equilibrium strategies in the appendix. We could easily assume that the probability
that shirking is detected is less than one; however, this would not qualitatively a￿ect the results. This type of
implicit contract corresponds to an e￿ciency wage as denoted by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1982).
13This assumption is for simplicity and arises from the stationarity of the model in steady state. With probabilistic
turnover, individuals would transition out of and into employment in steady state, but the qualitative nature of
the equilibrium would be unchanged.
11Substituting in the steady state conditions, y(t + 1) = (1 + g)y(t) and y(t) is proportional to





We leave to the appendix formal statement of the strategies played by workers and ￿rms which
support this as an equilibrium outcome.
The wage premium paid to a contract worker is decreasing in the growth rate g: This is
because, when the economy is growing quickly, people value their future relationships more since
they hold in store higher expected value, and therefore a smaller premium is required today to
induce e￿ort.15 In contrast, in a slowdown, the opposite is true. So when growth slows, there is
an increase in the disparity between contractor and employee wages, a point to which we return
later.
3.2 Internal labor markets
Recall that intermediate production occurs in ￿rms owning the state of the art technology in
their sectors. Usually, these ￿rms do not have a signi￿cant role in this type of growth model,
since their pro￿ts are distributed to the dispersed shareholders of the economy, and it is assumed
they simply hire labor at the going wage, see Grossman and Helpman (1991). Here, however,
we identify ￿rms with their incumbency as owners of the state of the art technology. This has
already been done implicitly in calculating the discounted value of future ￿rm pro￿ts, V; which
depends on the ￿rm’s expected lifetime, 1
￿￿:
If ￿rms can credibly commit to paying employees in the future for e￿ort exerted today, there
exists another solution to the non-contractibility problem which we term an internal labor market.
The implicit contract between worker and ￿rm, in this case, speci￿es that the worker contributes
e￿ort up front in promise of deferred payment. At the end of the period, when the ￿rm can
personally verify the worker’s contribution, the worker is paid. The worker undertakes to continue
with the ￿rm only if the ￿rm met its promised payment. For this solution to work, it is necessary
that ￿rms who renege on promised payments are punished in their future dealings in the labor
market. Once again, punishments arise as equilibrium responses to deviating behavior, as speci￿ed
formally in the appendix. Intuitively, punishment here consists of future workers not believing
that this ￿rm will meet their promised payments, and hence choosing to reject o￿ers of deferred
payment, i.e. not believing in the ￿rm’s promised internal rewards. Given those beliefs, and that
14Note that, in steady state, the contractor’s payment will bind at this incentive compatible wage in industries
with worker moral hazard. This is because for higher contractor wages, workers currently working at w(t) can
credibly o￿er their services as a contractor for an amount greater than w(t) but still below the wage of existing
contractors, thus upsetting the equilibrium. We return to this in section 3.4.
15Note that with CES preferences this is not swamped by the increase in interest rate except the logarithmic,
￿ = 0; case.
12strategy of workers, the best response for ￿rms who have cheated in the past is to, in fact, cheat
any worker who does accept a job, since given their reputation is already destroyed they su￿er
no additional reputational loss.16
This relational contract solves the moral hazard problem in production if ￿rms value their
reputations for honest dealing with employees su￿ciently. This depends on their discount rate and
their length of expected incumbency. Since a ￿rm only lives pro￿tably until the next innovation
arrives in its industry, it discounts future pro￿ts by the probability of an innovation arriving as
well as the discount factor, r.
A critical di￿erence between this solution to the moral hazard problem, and the previous
contractor solution, is that the ￿rm need only promise to pay workers the going wage, w(t); at
the end of the period. There is no need for a wage premium. However, if they cheat and fail to
pay workers, they obtain y(t) today without cost in the current period, since the optimal form
of cheating will be to renege on all payments. The cost to cheating is that then they can only
continue to produce in the future by contracting out production, hence by paying wc (t); which
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Using our equilibrium conjectures, and the derived relationship between wc(t) and w(t) this
condition simpli￿es as follows:
Lemma 1 A necessary and su￿cient condition for ￿rms’ incentive compatibility conditions to
hold is that their industry’s probability of receiving a successful innovation, ￿; satis￿es
￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿: (9)
We denote
￿￿￿ = 1 ￿ ￿: (10)
Any industry with an innovation rate greater than ￿￿￿ cannot credibly maintain an internal
labor market and must hire contract workers. It is also important to note a high value of ￿; a
16Once again, we specify the precise strategies supporting this \hiring" equilibrium in the appendix. See also
Bull (1987) for an early version of a ￿rm moral hazard solution to the contracting problem.
13high e￿ciency of research e￿ort, implies that it is harder to hire employees. The intuition for
this cut{o￿ is subtle. Firms, if they cheat their workers, must pay future workers their incentive
compatible wage from then on. This embeds the worker’s incentive constraint within the ￿rm’s
constraint. Firms and workers trade of the bene￿t of cheating today against the cost of a loss
in the future. They each discount the future using the rate of interest, and the rate of growth.
A worker also discounts by the probability of leaving the labour market, 1 ￿ ￿. While a ￿rm
discounts by the probability of leaving production, ￿￿: The ￿rm’s incentive constraint will hold
given that the worker constraint holds if and only if the ￿rm values the future at least as much
as the worker. So, the constraint will hold if and only if 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿:
3.3 E￿ects of Contracting on Firms
What if the constraint in Lemma 1 fails to be satis￿ed in some sectors? In particular, suppose that
there exists a ￿￿ with implied ￿￿￿ such that incentive constraints are satis￿ed for all ￿m ￿ ￿￿,
and therefore, these industries can employ workers at wage w(t). Industries in sectors ￿m > ￿￿
however cannot satisfy their incentive constraints, and therefore have to hire in contractors, at
a higher wage, to undertake the production labor that is being undertaken by employees in the
other sectors. (Recall that absent any contracting di￿culties, innovations arrive more rapidly
in sectors with higher values of ￿: As a consequence, ￿rms in these sectors will be the ones who
￿nd it most di￿cult to commit to their employees.)






where wm(t) is the wage paid in an industry in sector m.





















Note that, in order for production to occur at all, it is necessary that wj(t) < ￿jw(t). If this
is not the case, then the cost of labor is too great for any ￿rm to function pro￿tably in this
sector.17 When a technology becomes obsolete, its value to the owner is zero, and since it
is public information, it can be used by any individual. It is the free availability of obsolete
technologies that forces the new industry leader to limit price at the opportunity cost of human
17 Note that this condition holds trivially if, in equilibrium, w
j(t) = w(t):
14capital producing with the old technology, i.e. w(t): In that case, the maximized value of pro￿t
is given by:




where wc (t) is given by equation (8): Pro￿ts will be positive in all industries provided ￿j is
su￿ciently high. A su￿cient condition for this is:







Recall that ￿1 is the value of ￿ in the lowest sector, so this condition will also hold in all other
sectors. Since g ￿ 0; this ensures (11) is positive, and that production is feasible when hiring
contractors.18
The innovation problems remain essentially unchanged except that now the expected value
of an innovation is a function of the contracting environment. Innovation levels are then implied
by the following expressions in all j industries where contractors operate,
￿￿(Sc
j)







]y(t + 1) = w(t); (13)
where Sc
j denotes the number of researchers in an industry that is constrained to hire contractors.
In those industries where producers can credibly hire labor, innovation levels are given by the
same relationship as in Section 2.3, that is:
￿￿(Sj)






]y(t + 1) = w(t) (14)




[Lj (t) + Sj (t)]dj; (15)
where Sj (t) = Sj for hiring industries
and Sj (t) = Sc





Assuming, for now, that there exists a value of ￿ denoted ￿￿ such that for ￿m > ￿￿ production












where, in the above equation, industries are grouped by common values of ￿m. Finally, the
interest rate is determined, as in Section 2.3, from consumer’s preferences, equation (6): The
formal de￿nition of an equilibrium is given in the following section.
18This assumption is made for convenience only. If this were not to hold in some low ￿ sectors, innovation would
simply stop in those industries, which, as will be seen subsequently, would further enhance the slowdown.
153.4 Equilibria with contracting incompleteness
An equilibrium, or steady state, is a number of research workers, Sj; and a corresponding labor
allocation to production, Lj for each industry, j; such that:
(I) the labor market clears (equation (15) holds),
(II) in sectors where an internal labor market operates, Sj satis￿es equation (14) and condition
(9) holds,
(III) in sectors where contractors undertake production, Sj satis￿es equation (13) and condition
(7) holds,
(IV) in all sectors, Lj satis￿es (16),
(V) the equilibrium growth rate is given from (17), and,
(VI) as in Section 2:3; r is determined by (6):
In addition to these conditions, ￿rms’ and employees’ strategies must support honest ful￿llment
of implicit contracts, that is, the equilibrium strategies support conditions (7) and (9); as further
elaborated in the appendix.
There may exist multiple steady states, each with di￿erent contracting structures across in-
dustries, a point which we discuss further below. However it is possible to exploit the similarity
between the model here, and that used in Aghion and Howitt (1992) to show that there exists a
unique stationary steady state given a ￿xed contracting structure:
Proposition 2 Holding constant the structure of contracts within each industry, there exists a
unique stationary steady state.
Consider further the possibility for multiple steady states, with di￿ering contracting struc-
tures, in this framework. To see this, consider a steady state in which at least one industry hires
contractors. For such a steady state to exist implies that (9) holds in that industry, and equilib-
rium strategies are such that they support ￿rms meeting their obligations for promised deferred
payments. Now, consider a slight modi￿cation of the steady state in which equilibrium strategies
in this one industry support contracting instead of hiring. Since the conditions under which con-
tracting can be supported by equilibrium strategies are always satis￿ed, from Assumption 2, it
will always be possible to ￿nd strategies which support (7). Also, since a change in one industry
has an arbitrarily small e￿ect on aggregate variables, this alteration of the initial steady state will
itself constitute a steady state too. In general, the existence of any steady state where production
occurs with hiring, implies the existence of another in which hiring is changed to contracting in
some, or all, sectors. It is thus not possible to rule out the simultaneous existence of di￿erent
steady states with di￿ering contracting structures.
How do we then select between di￿ering contracting structures, and hence di￿ering steady
states? The strategy we follow here is to pick that feasible contracting structure with the highest
implied growth rate.
16ASSUMPTION 3: When there exist multiple, stable, stationary steady states, the economy is
in the one with the highest implied growth rate.
This is always the steady state with the contracting structure in which the most sectors
are able to hire employees rather than contractors, since these are hired at opportunity costs,
wj (t) = w(t) < wc (t); so that innovation pro￿ts are higher from equation (11).
Thus, Assumption 3 ensures that production is undertaken within each sector by hiring em-
ployees unless this is not feasible. A sector k then will not be able to hire employees only if,
were it to do so (while holding employment relations constant in all other sectors), the implied
innovation rate in sector k, ￿￿(Sk) given by (14) exceeds ￿￿￿ given from condition (10). It is
immediate from (14) that this problem is more likely to arise in the high ￿ sectors. Intuitively,
the high ￿ sectors attract the most research e￿ort, ceteris pararbus, and thus the highest arrival
rate of innovations. Consequently these are the sectors in which ￿rms are least able to credibly
commit to long term relationships with their employees. We are now ready to show the existence
of a unique steady state maximizing the economy’s growth rate.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique value of m denoted m￿ satisfying equilibrium conditions
(I)-(VI) that maximizes the economy’s growth rate. In this steady state, all sectors m ￿ m￿ hire
workers and (9) holds, all remaining sectors m > m￿ hire contractors and (7) holds.
There exist many possible steady states, but, from Proposition 2, a unique one for each con-
tracting structure. Assumption 3 is an equilibrium selection device, which focuses our attention
on the contracting structure corresponding to that steady state with the highest growth rate.
The proposition demonstrates that such a stationary steady state always exists.
3.5 Information Technology
There are many e￿ects that the introduction of computers and the general revolution in informa-
tion can be thought of as having had on production: it can increase the need for training, lead
to a substitution of capital for labor, improve distribution, directly change production e￿ciency,
etc. We wish to abstract from all of these and focus purely upon the increase in the availability
of information and the speed of the dissemination of new ideas. In this way, we focus purely
on the e￿ect of the information technology revolution of speeding the arrival of new ideas (or
equivalently of reducing the cost of research). We will posit that this is a truly general purpose
technology that improves the research productivity of all sectors, though qualitatively similar
results will obtain if only some sectors are a￿ected, or if sectors are a￿ected to di￿erent degrees.
To look at the consequences of such a change, we consider the e￿ect of an increase in the
technological parameter, ￿; which captures the e￿ect of research on the probability of an inno-
vation arriving. If the contracting structure within industries remains unchanged, this is exactly
17analogous to the model in Section 2.3, and the rate of growth, given in (5) will increase with the
increase in research e￿ectiveness.
But it is not always possible for the contracting structure to remain unchanged. Starting in a
situation in which all sectors have internal labor markets (that is, there is no contract work) the
e￿ect of increasing ￿ is to eventually make hiring contractors the only solution:
Proposition 4 Starting from a steady state in which all ￿rms use internal labor markets, in-
creasing ￿ implies that the number of sectors in which work is performed by contractors rises
(weakly). There exists a level of ￿ above which no sectors can use internal labor markets (that is,
all work eventually becomes contract work).
The contracting structure is not impervious to changes in ￿ because the increase in arrival
rates, ￿￿; eventually renders ￿rms’ expected lifetimes short. If short enough, ￿rms cannot credi-
bly commit to providing deferred bene￿ts to employees. This problem arises earlier for industries
with higher ￿; since these are the industries that attract proportionately more research, and hence
have higher arrival rates, holding all else equal.
As ￿ increases, and a sector becomes unable to hire workers and must hire contractors, we then
look for a steady state in which only that sector has changed its contracting, keeping ￿xed the
contracting structure in other sectors, since equilibrium strategies elsewhere will be unaltered, in
accordance with Assumption 3. It is in this case, when a sector is transformed from an employee to
a contract worker environment, that growth may slow, as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If a small increase in the technology parameter implies that a sector (say ￿m￿)
changes from hiring employees to hiring contract workers, then growth falls if ￿m￿ is su￿ciently
close to ￿M.
What is the intuition of this result? When a sector shifts contract structure from an internal
labor market to contractors, research labor is taken from that sector and reallocated to other
sectors. Some of this labor goes to production and some into research elsewhere. From concavity
of industry level research functions, the marginal value of labor in research is strictly lower in the
sectors where it is reallocated than where it originated. However, the marginal private value of
research does not correspond to its social value, since the productive contribution of innovations
varies with the contracting structure. In sectors where labor is performed by contracting (rel-
atively high ￿ sectors) innovators receive proportionately less of the returns to innovation than
in sectors featuring within ￿rm employment. This distorts the allocation of labor away from the
social optimum, with too little occurring in the sectors with high ￿: It is possible then that the
reallocation of labor occurring after the change in one sector’s contracting structure raises growth
by redirecting resources towards the high ￿ sectors. This e￿ect cannot occur if the distortion is
not present, hence the e￿ect of a change in contracting structure is unambiguously bad when all
18sectors were initially equivalent in contracting, or if the sector changing is close enough in ￿ to the
high ￿ sectors. Another implication then, is that as more industries shift towards using contract
workers, research is increasingly being transferred into sectors with high values of ￿. As a result,
the shifting contract structure becomes more likely to increase growth. Consequently, as more
industries transform their employment relationships from internal labor markets to contractors,
the slowdown disappears.
However, the main point here is that with a change in contracting structure, a slowdown can
occur. The next corollary lists the qualitative nature of any changes that accompany a slowdown
in this model.
Corollary 6 If an increase in ￿ causes a slowdown, then: (i) the proportion of the labor force
under short term employment increases, but (ii) turnover does not necessarily increase, (iii)
relative returns of workers in high ￿ sectors rise, (iv) income inequality increases and (v) sectors
with the largest declines in productivity growth will be the ones that initially had the highest rates
of growth
There can be no slowdown without a restructuring of labor contracts in some sectors. Without
such a change, the arrival of innovations simply increases with a rise in ￿; and growth rises.
A lower growth rate lowers individuals’ valuations of the future and they must be compensated
more immediately to maintain incentives. Since contractors start at higher wages than employ-
ees, further changes in the contracting structure along the slowdown, worsen inequality in the
earnings distribution by lowering returns to workers while simultaneously increasing the premium
to contractors. Since the increase here would not be attributable to observable worker charac-
teristics (for example, education and training levels), unless earnings equations were estimated
with information about contract structure, it would be picked up in the residual of an earnings
equation.19 This corresponds well with the ￿ndings of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) where
such earnings equations (which are estimated without information about the form of employment
contracts) attributed much of the growth in inequality to unmeasured components.
Furthermore, the increases that occur happen in the high ￿ sectors. That is, these will tend
to occur in industries where, for given contracting structure, there are higher growth rates. A
positive correlation between industry wages and technological change has been observed in many
studies, Hodson and England (1986), Dickens and Katz (1987) and Loh (1992). Though, it
should be noted that Bartel and Sicherman (1999), by controlling for individual ￿xed e￿ects,
argue that most of this is due to sorting of high \ability" individuals into sectors with higher
rates of technological change, something we cannot address here.
19This serves to make this model testably di￿erent than Galor and Moav’s (1999) model with technological
change which is ability biased, where ability is unobservable.
19The model’s implications for turnover are unclear, and further, the sectoral e￿ects are not
robust to di￿erent speci￿cations of the e￿ects of IT revolution. According to the model, turnover
rates rise when ￿ increases in all sectors that do not change their contracting structure, since
innovation occurs at a faster rate in those sectors due to their increased research numbers. How-
ever turnover will in fact slow in any sector that has undergone a shift toward contract workers.
This may seem curious since it is maintained that these sectors can no longer support employee
relationships due to an implied innovation rate that is too high. The reason is that with an
increase in ￿; a steady state with employees no longer exists since the implied industry level
innovation rate, were employee relationships to be maintained, is too high to satisfy ￿rm incen-
tive compatibility, i.e., equation (9) fails. In that case, the only stationary steady state where
incentive compatibility conditions hold, is one in which contractors operate.20
On the one hand then, turnover falls in the sectors that most recently experienced the change
in contracting structure, but on the other, turnover can increase in sectors where contracting has
remained unchanged, due to the displacement of research labor from the sectors where contracting
changed: Thus the net e￿ect on turnover is ambiguous at the aggregate level. This may provide a
possible explanation for why perceptions of greater job insecurity as evidenced by worker surveys,
(especially among white collar workers, see Aaronson and Sullivan 1998) have not been re￿ected
in aggregate turnover ￿gures in either the US, (Diebold, Neuman and Polansky 1997), or Canada,
(Green and Riddell 1997).
With regards to sectoral level implications, we have assumed that the growth in productivity
caused by the IT revolution a￿ects all sectors proportionately. However, if this is not the case
the model’s predictions about sectoral break-downs of turnover will vary. In particular, sectors
which experienced no increase in productivity of research due to IT will experience no change in
turnover. Sectors experiencing a greater productivity increase will see a decline in turnover when
initially changing from an internal labor market to a contractor’s market, but if productivity
continues to increase they will experience increasing turnover. Since these predictions depend
on identifying the initial e￿ect of IT on each sector, which we do not attempt here, we remain
circumspect about the model’s implications for turnover.
An implication of the slowdown generated by an increasing ￿ is that it is of ￿nite duration.
In this framework, productivity can only fall with ￿ increasing if contracts change. In particular,
20This also raises the possibility of a shift from the stationary steady state with hiring, to a steady state which
cycles between hiring and contracting as in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We have not formally explored such a
possibility but it would conceivably involve multiple periods of low innovation activity within a sector due to low
expected pro￿ts, in which the low probability of innovation arrival, allowed ￿rms to credibly hire labour with
the promise of deferred payments. Then, with an innovation, there would be periods of high research activity
and correspondingly high expected pro￿ts, in which the high probability of an innovation arriving, would require
contracting to solve the moral hazard problem. We have purposefully ruled out analysis of such cycling steady
states but this will not a￿ect the slowdown result here. This is because any such steady state will also have lower
growth, since, in comparison with the hiring steady states, in a cycling steady state, for some periods at least,
innovators hire contractors, and the consequent rise in wages lowers incentives to innovate, and hence growth.
20when labor hiring practices in all sectors have changed towards contracts there will no longer
be the possibility of a slowdown precipitated by further increases in ￿: Though, for ￿ ￿xed,
productivity growth rates will remain at lower levels. However, the slowdown may end even
before this point if the high productivity sectors, that have already experienced their change in
contracting, start to absorb more research e￿ort displaced from lower productivity sectors, i.e. if
￿m￿ << ￿M.
The model also provides one explanation for a puzzling component of the empirical record.
Over the period of the slowdown, starting in the early 70s, using almost any measure, research
and development has increased. According to the model, although, after an increase in ￿; in
any sector that changes contracting structure research intensity will fall, the increase in research
productivity will induce more research in other sectors that did not undergo a change in their
contracting structure. Here it can easily be the case that this second e￿ect outweighs the ￿rst
yielding an increase in aggregate research. The intuition for why more research doesn’t necessarily
lead to more growth is that it is not only the aggregate level of research that matters but also
its distribution. The di￿erences in contracting structure and thus of relative returns to research
across sectors distorts the allocation of research and reduces its contribution to growth.
In this model, we have assumed that population is ￿xed. However if instead of increasing the
technological parameter we increased the population, we could generate similar results. Fixing
the contracting structure, a population increase will increase the amount of research being un-
dertaking and therefore the arrival rates of new innovations through a standard scale e￿ect. This
interacts with the contracting structure in approximately the same manner as described above.
And so, in this model we can generate a short-term negative relationship between population
growth and the growth rate. A series of newer versions of technology based endogenous growth
already allow for the possibility of a negative relationship between population growth and pro-
ductivity growth. However, these models (Young 1998, Howitt 1999, and Segerstrom 1999) do
not suggest why the slowdown should have occurred when it did. In contrast, our model even
when change is motivated by population growth (not technology) relates the macro changes to
observed contemporaneous changes in the labor market and thus links the timing of the slowdown
to the period of those changes.
In steady state, all wages grow at the same rate. In this model without capital, any tran-
sitions associated with a change in the technology will occur instaneously. However in a more
general model if the economy were to experience a slowdown-inducing shock and then to grad-
ually transition to a new steady state with the implied greater wage disparity there would have
to be a period of time over which contractor wages would increase at a rate faster than wages
of workers in internal labor markets. Although this model cannot capture this dynamics, this
may be worth investigating in data series in which workers can be identi￿ed by their contractor
status, something which we leave to future research.
21A ￿nal point to note is that a ￿rm’s productive life is assumed to end when a new innovation
arrives. However, in reality, many ￿rms produce more than one type of good. These ￿rms may
still be able to provide a form of commitment to employees by shifting them from newly redundant
processes to other productive roles. In fact, within any one ￿rm, there will be employees with
di￿ering levels of job security, depending on how wedded their employment is to the technology
they are using in production. However, it will still be the case that the ￿rm’s commitment to
any particular employee will vary with that employee’s expected productive life with the ￿rm. A
￿rm’s capacity to commit to lengthy employment will not necessarily end with the arrival of faster
innovations at the industry level, but should still be negatively a￿ected by them. A similar ￿avor
of e￿ect has been explored by Bertrand (1999). She examines whether employment relationships
adjust under increased product market competition and found that increased ￿nancial pressure
(proxied through increased import competition) transformed the employment relationship from
one governed by implicit agreements to one governed by the market. An interpretation she
forwards, which is consistent with our hypothesis, is that increased competition weakens the
enforceability of wage agreements, so that the spot market governs the relationship.
4 Conclusion
Other explanations of the slowdown, such as Helpman and Trajtenberg’s (1996) explanation based
on the dissemination of General Purpose Technologies, or Lloyd-Ellis’s (1999) explanation, arising
from a fall in supply of quali￿ed workers and hence a reduction in absorptive capacity, are not
mutually exclusive. Certainly such supply side e￿ects would similarly slow down growth in our
model. The ultimate importance of contending explanations is an empirical issue, which we make
no claim to resolve here. A nice feature of our approach is that it suggests the source of increased
earnings dispersion which contemporaneously accompanied the slowdown, will be in the residual
of earnings regressions, as has been found in the data. Previous explanations, such as Greenwood
and Yorukoglu (1997) and Lloyd-Ellis (1999) need to posit a non-observable skill that the market
rewards but observers do not detect, in order to explain this increase in the residual. This may
in fact be the source of the increased earnings residual but there is no hope of testing this since
the variable is unobservable. Here, in contrast, our analysis predicts the precise nature of the
variable which is causing an increase in the residual component. The model predicts that the
workers with relatively increased earnings will be the contractors.
The model also reconciles perceptions of increased instability in the worker/￿rm relationship
with the relatively unchanged turnover rates observed in the data.21 Perceptions of instability
arise in these relationships because ￿rms no longer undertake to provide commitments of deferred
payments as part of a contract of lifetime employment. This is because ￿rms cannot themselves
21For a review of the work on changed perceptions of employment relationships see Sullivan (1999).
22credibly commit to needing workers in future, and hence persisting with their employment. We
have modeled this as ￿rm turnover, but, more realistically, any changes which induce wholesale
alteration of production methods, and restructuring, will be su￿cient to weaken a ￿rm’s commit-
ment, even if the ￿rm itself persists. However, an induced e￿ect of these labor market changes has
been a rise in the costs of obtaining skilled workers, which itself induces a reduction in innovative
activity, causing a slowdown. Thus the induced e￿ect, causes a force working in the opposite
direction to dampen turnover by increasing production stability. The net outcome on turnover
rates is thus unclear, and is consistent with unchanged turnover.
Finally, our focus on the division of rents between ￿rms and workers in the innovation process
is reminiscent of recent work by Caballero and Hammour (1997). They similarly couch their
analysis in an incomplete contracting environment, where ￿rms and workers bargain ex post over
the division of surplus to short run relationship speci￿c rents. They argue that increased ap-
propriability of these rents by labor that was caused by institutional change in some European
countries during the lates 1960’s and early 1970’s, induced a long run substitution towards capital
intensive, and labor excluding, technologies that were less subject to such appropriation. Conse-
quently, in those countries, it is argued that labor shares and employment fell. Since their focus
was on substitution between factors in the orientation of innovation they treated as exogenous
aggregate productivity growth, which is the focus here. Further, the institutional source of the
exogenous change used there limits their analysis to selected European countries and could not
therefore serve as a basis for the slowdown that occurred in, for example, the US or Japan.
5 Appendix A:
5.0.1 Strategies supporting the incentive compatible incomplete contracts
Information sets:
A strategy maps from each player’s information set to the set of actions.
Consistent with assumption 2, at any time t; all workers and ￿rms know the past history
of all ￿rm/worker employment pairs, referred to as their public history. In particular, it is
known whether a worker/￿rm relationship has terminated, though the reasons for it ending (dis-
missal or quitting) are not known. A worker’s public history at time t is denoted hw (t); with
hw (t) = 1 if the worker has not been involved in a termination for any ￿ ￿ t, and hw (t) = 0;
otherwise. Similarly, a ￿rm’s public history at time t is denoted hf (t); with hf (t) = 1 if the ￿rm
has not been involved in a termination for any ￿ ￿ t, and hf (t) = 0; otherwise. In addition, both
workers and ￿rms have some private information. A worker’s knows their own e￿ort contribution
upto time t. For worker i; this is denoted ei (t); with ei (t) = 1 if the worker has contributed
promised e￿ort for all ￿ ￿ t; and ei (t) = 0; otherwise. As well, the worker knows the payment
history of any ￿rm with which it has been involved. Thus, for ￿rm j the worker i knows whether
23j has paid the promised amounts to i in all previous interactions between i and j, denoted p
j
i (t):
If the ￿rm has paid all amounts that were promised then p
j
i (t) = 1; otherwise, p
j
i (t) = 0: In
the case of no previous interactions, p
j
i (t) = 1: Firms know their own private histories and the
histories of the workers in their interactions with them. Thus, ￿rm j knows whether it has paid
promised amounts to all its workers, if it has then pj (t) = 1; otherwise pj (t) = 0: If a ￿rm has
never before promised payments, then pj (t) = 1: Similarly, if a ￿rm has employed an employee i,
it knows whether the employee has contributed the promised amounts of e￿ort in its employment
at j, if it has for all ￿ ￿ t then e
j
i (t) = 1; otherwise e
j
i (t) = 0: If they have never before interacted,
e
j
i (t) = 1:
A worker’s information set in period t comprises the public histories of all ￿rms and workers
upto and including period t ￿ 1; hw (t ￿ 1) [ hf (t ￿ 1) as well as the private information they
have from their own employment history, ei (t ￿ 1); and the information they have on the set of




i (t ￿ 1)
o
for all j 2 Fi: A ￿rm’s information set
comprises the public histories of all ￿rms and workers upto and including period t￿1; hw (t ￿ 1)[
hf (t ￿ 1) as well as the private information they have from their own history as an employer. In
particular, they know pj (t ￿ 1) and the information they have on the set of workers who have








Denote a worker’s strategy by ￿w (t). It has two parts: ￿rstly, it speci￿es a decision of whether
to accept or reject every level of wage o￿er from every ￿rm, these wage o￿ers can be either up
front o￿ers, or o￿ers that a ￿rm promises to pay at the end of the period. Secondly, where up
front wage o￿ers have been accepted from a given ￿rm, it speci￿es a decision of whether to work
(ei = 1) or shirk (ei = 0) for a given ￿rm.
Denote a ￿rm’s strategy by ￿f (t): It has two parts: ￿rstly, whether to o￿er up front payments
to workers or to o￿er payments at the end of the period, and the amounts to o￿er. Then, for end
of period payments o￿ered to a particular worker, it speci￿es whether to honor those payments,
(pj = 1) or not (pj = 0).
5.0.2 Equilibrium strategies for an e￿ciency wage ‘contractor’ outcome:
Denote these strategies by e ￿f (t) and e ￿w (t) :
e ￿
f
j (t) for ￿rm j - For any worker i with hi (t ￿ 1) = 1 and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; o￿er wc
from equation (e￿wage) upfront, for all other workers make no o￿er. Do not honor commitments
to make deferred payments. Note that there is no turnover in the model, separations are actively
created by either a quit or a dismissal.
e ￿w
i (t) for individual i - accept any non-negative wage o￿er made upfront, do not accept o￿ers
of deferred wage payments. If w ￿ wc and hw (t ￿ 1) = 1 and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; then set
ei = 1; otherwise set ei = 0:
24These strategies induce, as an equilibrium wage in that sector, the wage wc with no workers
shirking and all ￿rms rehiring the same employees if and only if they do not shirk. To see this,
consider ￿rst the incentives of a worker to deviate from e ￿w
i (t). If the worker shirks, and works
elsewhere for the alternative wage of w(t) she cannot be made better o￿, since under e ￿
f
j (t) she
will never again be hired in an e￿ciency wage job so that incentive compatible wages are given
by equation (8); which de￿nes wc. Consider a ￿rms incentive to deviate from e ￿
f
j (t): Suppose the
￿rm decides not to dismiss a worker that shirks, then under e ￿w
i (t); the worker will shirk again,
so dismissing a shirker is optimal. Suppose that the ￿rm decides to dismiss a worker that has
not shirked, this makes the worker strictly worse o￿, but does not increase the ￿rm’s pro￿ts, thus
retaining a non-shirker is a weak best response.
5.0.3 Equilibrium strategies for a ‘hiring’ outcome:
Denote these strategies by b ￿f (t) and b ￿w (t) :
b ￿
f
j (t) for ￿rm j - If ￿ ￿ ￿￿ as de￿ned in (10); then, provided hj (t ￿ 1) = 1; and hi (t ￿ 1) = 1;
and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1 o￿er deferred payment of w(t) and honor the payment if and only if
the worker sets ei = 1: If ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and hj (t ￿ 1) = 0; hi (t ￿ 1) = 1 and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1;
then o￿er an upfront payment of wc: If ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and hj (t ￿ 1) = 1; and hi (t ￿ 1) = 0; and
pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; make no o￿er. If ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and hj (t ￿ 1) = 1; and hi (t ￿ 1) = 1;
and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 0; make no o￿er. If ￿ > ￿￿and hj (t ￿ 1) = 0; hi (t ￿ 1) = 1 and
pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; then o￿er an upfront payment of wc: If ￿ > ￿￿ and not [hj (t ￿ 1) = 0;
hi (t ￿ 1) = 1 and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1]; then make no o￿er.
b ￿w
i (t) for individual i - accept any non-negative wage o￿er made upfront. If an up frontwage
o￿er is such that w ￿ wc and hw (t ￿ 1) = 1 and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1; then set ei = 1;
otherwise set ei = 0: If ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and hj (t ￿ 1) = 1; and hi (t ￿ 1) = 1; and pj (t ￿ 1):eh
i (t ￿ 1) = 1
accept a deferred payment of w(t) and set ei = 1:
This induces an equilibrium in which workers accept a work o￿er with deferred payment of
w(t); set ei = 1; and ￿rms pay workers only if ei = 1: In equilibrium, no workers shirk and all
￿rms honor their payment commitments. To see this, note that equilibrium strategies state that
a ￿rm who has reneged on payments (and hence had a separation with an employee) will continue
to do so. Given this strategy, a worker’s best response is not to trust such deferred payments and
to instead work only for payments made up front. Then, however, payments satisfying workers’
incentive compatibility conditions, wc; will be required to induce e￿ort.
For completeness, it is also necessary to ensure that ￿rms who have been dishonest, and cannot
hire employees, cannot simply sell the technology to another ￿rm who has not been dishonest and
therefore values the technology more highly than the initial ￿rm. We rule this out informally by
assuming that workers believe that any other ￿rm buying the cheating ￿rm’s technology will also
cheat their workers. Then the value of the technology to other ￿rms will be equivalent to that of
25the cheating ￿rm, and ￿rms will not be able to get around their cheating by simply going to the
market. Such a restriction on beliefs o￿ the equilibrium path is consistent with the equilibrium.
In general, as long as the ￿rm loses some value in selling the technology after cheating, it is
possible to construct an equilibrium in which a ￿rm would have an incentive to honor its wage
agreements and therefore workers would believe that the new ￿rm was not a cheater and therefore
accept employee positions. In such an equilibrium, workers would believe that the ￿rm values its
reputation enough to not be willing to incur the cost associated with cheating even if they could
subsequently sell their technology. However, if there were no cost to cheating, either through
punishment by workers or through value loss in the ￿rm, no ￿rm would ever be able to hire
employees since the ￿rm would immediately cheat them and sell the ￿rm for its entire present
discounted value to another ￿rm.
6 Appendix B:
6.0.4 Proofs








(1 + g) ￿ 1:
Given wc(t) = 1+r
￿(1+g)w(t) this directly simpli￿es to the expression in the lemma.￿
Proof of Proposition 1: Holding the contract structure ￿xed across industries, the model is almost
a multiple sector version of Aghion and Howitt (1992), in particular, the sectoral allocation
of human capital where hiring occurs is given by (14) which is similar to Aghion and Howitt
(1992 eq.3.33 p. 333). There are four di￿erences from their framework: (1) r is determined
endogenously, (2) for sectors in which contracting is undertaken, instead of hiring, human capital is
allocated according to (13), (3) the term ￿0 in their analysis (the marginal product) is replaced by
￿￿=S (the average product) here and (4) contracting in production is incomplete. Consider points
(2) and (3) ￿rst. In sectors where (13) determines the allocation of human capital, Assumption
A is su￿cient for production to be viable and the concavity of ￿ implies that the distribution of
research activity across sectors is unique. Furthermore, since ￿￿=S satis￿es the restrictions of ￿0
used in Aghion and Howitt, the proof of uniqueness used there applies directly for exogenous r.






and r enters negatively into the denominator of the left hand side (LHS) of equation (13): Consider
the equilibrating response in Si for an increase in g; all other changes will not a￿ect r and hence
the proof of uniqueness (except for an increase in ￿ which is trivial). With an increase in g the
right hand side falls. In Aghion-Howitt (ie. ignoring the change in r) for equality to be restored,
26Si must rise. Now suppose that r is treated as endogenous, then, for an increase in g; r also rises.
This lowers the denominator on the LHS and thus increases the LHS necessitating an increase
in Si to equilibrate, which is the same as when r was treated as exogenous. Thus endogenizing
r yields no change in the equilibrating response of Si and no change in the uniqueness of the
equilibrium: Finally, the incompleteness in contracting implies that production arrangements
must be self-enforcing. They will be so if, in sectors where hiring occurs, beliefs are as described
by (i) above, and if, in sectors where contracting occurs, beliefs conform with (ii).￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Proof is by construction. First suppose that human capital is allocated
according to (14) in all sectors, that is, labor is hired, not contractors, and estimate ￿ denoted
￿￿(M) given by (10), (17), and (16). This yields a vector of Sm values, one for each sector m:
There are 3 possible cases to consider. Case (1): ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (M) 8 m: In that case, set m￿ = M;
and all sectors hire labor under (14). This is feasible since (9) holds, and it clearly satis￿es
Assumption 3, since Sk solving (14) necessarily exceeds Sk solving (13). Case (2): ￿ > ￿￿ (M)
8 m; so that (9) fails: In that case, set m￿ = 0. To see that this satis￿es Assumption 3, consider a
change in one sector, k’s production arrangements so that labor is, instead, hired under contract.
This lowers the equilibrium allocation of human capital to k since Sk solving (14) necessarily
exceeds Sk solving (13): Consequently, g falls from (17) and so does r from (??): This implies
a fall in ￿￿; so that ￿ will, once again, exceed ￿￿ in all sectors, implying that (9) fails in all
sectors. This will continue to be true, irrespective of the contracting structure in industries, since
it is true for the most favorable case of all industries hiring labor. Thus it is not possible for any
industry to hire labor, all production is undertaken by contractors under (7) yielding m￿ = 0:
Case (3): ￿(SM) > ￿￿ (M) but ￿(S1) ￿ ￿￿ (M): By the monotonic ordering of sectors, this
implies that there exists some sector, denoted m0 2 [2;M] such that ￿(Sm0) > ￿￿ (M); but
￿(Sm0￿1) ￿ ￿￿ (M): By the same reasoning as in case (2), sectors m0 to M must be contracting
sectors. Thus, calculate a revised value for ￿￿ by supposing that (13) holds for all sectors m0
and above, while, (14) holds for all sectors m0 ￿ 1 and below. Denote this value ￿￿ (m0): If
￿(Sm0￿1) ￿ ￿￿ (m0) then set m￿ = m0 ￿ 1: This satis￿es Assumption 3, since (9) will hold for
all ￿rms equal to and below m0 ￿1; and it can never hold for the others. If ￿(Sm0￿1) > ￿￿ (m0),
then calculate a new value of ￿￿ by imposing that all sectors from m0 ￿1 and above are contract
sectors and thus solve (13): Denote this value ￿￿ (m0 ￿ 1). If ￿(Sm0￿2) ￿ ￿￿ (m0 ￿ 1) then
set m￿ = m0 ￿ 2: Where, by the same reasoning as above, this value of m is the steady state
maximizing the economy’s growth rate. If ￿(Sm0￿2) > ￿￿ (m0 ￿ 1) then repeat the same process
in the previous step for sector m0 ￿3 and so on: Stop when either ￿(Sm0￿1￿i) ￿ ￿￿ (m0 ￿ i) and
then set m￿ = m0 ￿ 1 ￿ i; or i = m0; in which case m￿ = 0:￿
Proof of Proposition 3: This follows immediately from the steady state equations. As ￿ increases,
the wage rate falls and the number of researchers in each sector increases, as dictated by the ￿rst
27order condition (14). This increases the innovation rate in every sector that hires employees.
Eventually, increasing ￿ will yield an innovation rate that violates each ￿rm’s incentive compat-
ibility condition, condition (9). In other words, eventually ￿(Sm) > ￿￿ calculated from (10) for
all sectors m:￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose that sector ￿m￿ goes from being a sector which can credibly
hire employees to one that must hire contract workers as a result of the increase in ￿ to ￿0 > ￿.
The implied change in the growth rate can be represented as follows



















where the superscript c denotes that these innovation levels are for a sector that must use contract

















































m￿(￿0) ￿ Sm￿(￿)] + L0 ￿ L
Substitution for [Sc
m￿(￿0) ￿ Sm￿(￿)] yields



































28It is su￿cient to show that the RHS of (18) is negative as ￿0 ! ￿. First, we will assume that
the amount of labour in production is unaltered. So, L0 ￿L = 0. For an arbitrarily small change
in ￿, the amount of labour allocated to production will not fall. However, it may rise since the
sector that switches its contracting structure will release some research workers. However, if the
result obtains given this assumption (that L0 = L) then it will obtain if more labour is admitted
to production since this additional removal of some workers from research can only reduce the
rate of growth.



















for k > m￿ (20)













>From the innovation problem, it follows that Sm￿(￿) > Sk(￿); implying that the ￿rst fraction





￿k(￿m￿￿1) which follows immediately given 1 < ￿k < ￿m￿.
To show (20): First note that if m￿ = M; there is no condition (20) and the proof is concluded.


















￿k(￿m￿￿1) since ￿k > ￿m￿: So the result will require that 1 ￿
(1+g)
(1+r)(1 ￿
￿￿(Sm￿(N))) be su￿ciently larger than 1 ￿
(1+g)
(1+r)(1 ￿ ￿￿(Sk(N))). It will be larger if ￿m￿ >
￿(1+g)￿k. So as ￿m￿ ! ￿k, (20) will hold for k > m￿. And in particular, when ￿m￿ ! ￿M, this
condition holds.￿
References
[1] Abraham, K. G. (1990) \Restructuring the employment relationship: The Growth of Market-
Mediated Work Arrangements", in New Developments in the Labor Markets, towards a new
institutional paradigm, ed. by K.G. Abraham and R. Makersie, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
29[2] Abraham, Katharine G. and Susan K. Taylor (1996) \Firms’ Use of Outside Contractors:
Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 14: 394-424.
[3] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992) A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction, Econo-
metrica, 60: 323-51.
[4] Aaronson, D and D. Sullivan (1998) The decline of job security in the 1990s: displacement
anxiety, and their e￿ect on wage growth, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Per-
spectives, 22 (1): 17-43.
[5] Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1997) Relational contracts and the theory of the ￿rm, mimeo,
MIT, downloadable at: http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT ID=2211.
[6] Bartel, A.P. and N. Sicherman (1999) \Technological change and wages: an interindustry
analysis", Journal of Political Economy, 107(2): 285-325.
[7] Bertrand, M. (1999) From the invisible handshake to the invisible hand? How import com-
petition changes the employment relationship, NBER working paper no. 6900.
[8] Blanchard, O. (1997) \The Medium Run", MIT, mimeo.
[9] Boisjoly, J, G.J. Duncan and T. Smeeding (1998) The shifting incidence of involuntary job
losses from 1968-1992 Industrial Relations 37, 207-31.
[10] Bull, C. (1987) \The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts", Quarterly-Journal-of-
Economics, 102(1): 147-59.
[11] Caballero, R. J., Hammour,M.L. (1996) On the Timing and E￿ciency of Creative Destruc-
tion Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics; 111(3), 805-52.
[12] Caballero, R.J. and Hammour, M.L. (1997) Jobless growth: appropriability, factor substitu-
tion and unemployment, MIT working paper no. 97-18.
[13] Cohany, S. R. (1996) \Workers in Alternative Employment Arrangements," Monthly Labor
Review, 119(10): 31-45.
[14] Diebold, N. and F. Polsky (1997) \Job Stability in the US," Journal of Labor Economics,
15(2): 206-233.
[15] Dolmas, J., B. Raj, and D.J. Slottje (1999) \The US productivity slowdown: a peak through
the structural break window," Economic Inquiry, 37: 226.
[16] Farber, H. (1988) Are lifetime jobs disappearing: job duration in the United States 1973-
1993, in Labor Statistics Measurement Issues, ed. by J. Haltiwanger, M. Manser and R.
Topel, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
30[17] Galor, O. and O. Moav (1999) \Ability-Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequality
and Economic Growth", Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[18] Galor, O. and D. Tsiddon (1997) \Technological Progress, Mobility, and Economic Growth",
American Economic Review, 87(3): 363-382.
[19] Gibbons, R. (1997) \Incentives and Careers in Organizations", in Advances in Economics
and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, 7th World Congress, Vol. 2, ed. D. Kreps and
K. Wallis, Cambridge University Press.
[20] Gordon, D.M. (1996) Fat and mean: the corporate squeeze of working Americans and the
myth of managerial downsizing, New York, The Free Press.
[21] Gordon, R.J. (1996) Problems in the measurement and performance of service-sector pro-
ductivity in the United States, NBER working paper no. 5519.
[22] Green, D. and C. Riddell (1997) \Job Durations in Canada: Is Long-term Employment
Declining," Transition and Structural Change in the North American Labor Market, IRC
Press, Kingston, Ontario.
[23] Greenwood, Jeremy and Boyan Jovanovic (1999)\The Information-Technology Revolution
and the Stock Market," American Economic Review, 89(2): 116-22
[24] Greenwood, J and M. Yorukoglu (1997) \1974" Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, 46, June, 97-106.
[25] Gregg, P. and J. Wadsworth (1995) \A Short History of Labor Turnover, Job Tenure, and
Job Security 1975-93," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 11(1): 73-90.
[26] Grilliches, Z (1994) \Productivity, R and D and the Data constraint", American Economic
Review, 84 (March): 1-20.
[27] Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[28] Hart, O. (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.
[29] Hart, O. and J. Moore (1998) \Foundations of Incomplete Contracts", Harvard University,
mimeo.
[30] Helpman, E. and A. Rangel (1999) \Adjusting to a New Technology: Experience and Train-
ing", Journal of Economic Growth, 4: 359-383.
31[31] Helpman, E. and M. Trajtenberg (1996) \Di￿usion of General Purpose Technologies", Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper: 5773.
[32] Howitt, P. (1999) \Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D Inputs Growing",
Journal of Political Economy, 107(4): 715-730.
[33] Idson, T. and R.G. Valletta (1996) Seniority, sectoral decline and employee retention: an
aanalysis of layo￿ unemployment spells, Journal of Labor Economics 14 (4): 654-76.
[34] Jones, C.I. (1998) \Sources of US economic growth in a world of ideas", Stanford University,
mimeo.
[35] Juhn, C., K. M. Murphy, and B. Pierce (1993) Wage inequality and the rise in returns to
skill, Journal of Political Economy, 101(June): 410-442.
[36] Kletzer, L. G. (1998) Job displacement, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (1) 115-36.
[37] Lloyd-Ellis, H. (1999) \Endogenous technological change and wage inequality," American
Economic Review, 89 (1): 47-77.
[38] Loh, E S. (1992) \Technological changes, training and inter-industry wage structure," Quar-
terly Review of Economics and Finance, 32: 26-44.
[39] Malcomson, J.M. (1999) Individual Employment Contracts, in Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, Volume 3, Edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Elsevier.
[40] MacLeod, W.B. and J.M. Malcomson (1993) \Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market
Contracts", American Economic Review, 83: 811-37.
[41] MacLeod, W.B., J.M. Malcomson and Gomme (1994) Labor turnover and the natural rate of
unemployment: e￿ciency wage versus frictional unemployment, Journal of Labor Economics,
12 (2): 276-315.
[42] New York Times (1998) \Equal Work, Less-Equal Perks", Monday March 30.
[43] Oliner, S.D. and D.E. Sichel (2000) \The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990’s: Is Infor-
mation Technology the Story? Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series # 2000-20.
[44] Osterman, P. (1996) Broken Ladders: Managerial Careers in the New Economy. Oxford
University Press, New York.
[45] Ramey, G. and J. Watson (1997) Contractual Fragility, job destruction and business cycles,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (3):873-911.
32[46] Schmidt, S. (1999) \Long-Run Trends in Workers’ Beliefs about Their Own Job Security:
Evidence from the General Scoial Survey", Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4): S127.
[47] Segal, Lewis M. and Daniel G. Sullivan (1997) \The Growth of Temporary Services Work."
Journal of Economic Perspectives, v.11 : 117-136.
[48] Segerstrom, P. (1999) \Endogenous Growth without Scale E￿ects," American Economic
Review, 88(5): 1290{1310.
[49] Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz (1984) \Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline De-
vice," American Economic Review, 74(3): 433-44.
[50] Sichel, D.E. (1997) \The Productivity Slowdown: Is a Growing Unmeasurable Sector the
Culprit?" Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(3): 367-70.
[51] Smith, V. (1997) \New forms of work organization," Annual Review of Sociology, 23: 315-
340.
[52] Sullivan, S.E. (1999) \The changing nature of careers: a review and research agenda," Jour-
nal of Management, 25(3): 457.
[53] Time magazine, \Disposable Workers" J. Castro, March 29, 1993, pg 43-7.
[54] Valletta, R. (1998) Changes in the structure and duration of US unemployment, 1967-1998,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Review, 3: 29-40.
[55] Valletta, R. (1999) \Declining Job Security", Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4): S170.
[56] Wol￿, E.N. (1996) \The Productivity Slowdown: The Culprit at Last? Follow-Up on Hulten
and Wol￿", American Economic Review, 86(5): 1239-52.
[57] Young, A. (1998) \Growth without Scale E￿ects," Journal of Political Economy, 106(1):
41-63.
33